The following piece is from Bonar

The following piece is from Bonar's book 'Truth and Error' or 'Letter to a friend on some controversies of the day.' This is letter 5 from that book.

Predestination & Foreknowledge.

"Being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will."—Ephesians 1:11.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

It is of some importance that we should settle the real nature of these two things, predestination and foreknowledge, and ascertain which of the two is first. The question is, does God fix a thing, simply because he foreknows it, or does he foreknow it because he has fixed it? There are vague ideas in men's minds on those points, and it is well to know the truth with distinctness.

I answer then unhesitatingly, that predestination must be the foundation of foreknowledge. God foreknows everything that takes place, because he has fixed it. In proof of this I remark,

1. The opposite of this is impossibility. To fix a thing is to make that thing certain to come to pass, which, but for that fixing, would not have come to pass. If then there be any kind of foreknowledge before predestination, it is simply the foreknowledge that the thing which he desires would not come to pass, unless he sees fit to fix it. God knew all that might possibly have come to pass had he let the world alone to act out its iniquity. In all that infinity of possibles, he saw that the thing he wanted was not to be found. Seeing the end from the beginning, he saw that the thing he desired would never come to pass unless brought into being by a direct act of his own will. No other will would desire or could effect that which he saw to be best, either in regard to persons or events. The thing he wanted was not to be found among the possibles, but among the impossibles, if matters were left to themselves, and to the operation of the usual laws. How then shall that which is impossible be rendered not only possible but certain? Evidently by the direct interference of God. God having thus interfered and arranged everything according to his wisdom, of necessity must know them as to come to pass. In other words, he foreknows everything, because he has arranged everything. Everything is certain in his foreknowledge, because everything is certain in his arrangements.

Take the case of a saved sinner, such as Saul of Tarsus. In looking forward from eternity, God saw that sinner. He saw him in his guilt and sin. He saw him hastening away from himself. He saw that if left to himself, or to the usual laws of things, he would only go deeper into sin, and farther from himself. He saw that in such a case his salvation was impossible,—that he never would believe, and never repent, and never turn. This was all that mere foreknowledge could tell. Foreknowledge alone can say nothing as to salvation. But here predestination comes in. God forms a design to bring that man to glory; he is a "chosen vessel." And having this design regarding him, he resolves to put forth his power, he pre-arranges all his plans concerning him, he fixes the day and hour of his conversion, and thus he foreknows its certainty, because he has fore-arranged it. Otherwise it could not have been known; nay, it would have been impossibility.

2. The opposite of this is an absurdity. What can be more absurd than to fix a thing which I already know will come to pass, whether I fix it or not? This is truly imputing foolishness to God. It represents him as giving forth a solemn decree, to fix a thing which is already certain. As if the queen of this realm were giving forth a statute, decreeing that the sun should rise to-morrow, because she knew that such would be the case from the laws of nature. Is not this a mockery of God? It makes him thus to speak,—"I foreordain that such a sinner shall be saved, because I foresee that he will be saved." Unless, then, we impute folly to God, and affirm that there is no meaning in the word predestination, we must admit that God must foreordain before he foreknows, and that he knows everything, just because he has fore-arranged everything according to his own infinite wisdom and grace. These are two arguments which appear to me quite conclusive. But let us turn to Scripture. I need not again direct your attention to the passages already quoted in the previous letters I shall rather notice one or two on which I have not yet dwelt. Acts 2:23, "Him being delivered by the DETERMINATE COUNSEL and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." Acts 4:27, "Of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together for to do whatsoever THY HAND AND THY COUNSEL DETERMINED BEFORE to be done."

On these passages I would offer a few remarks,—

1. The language is very explicit and plain. It is the strongest that could possibly have been used to denote fore-ordination. There is nothing about it ambiguous or hard to be understood. To take it in any other sense would be absurd. The doctrine may be inscrutable, but the words are plain. And is the nature of the doctrine a reason for our refusing to take the words of God in their natural and simple sense?

2. Admitting our views of fore-ordination to be true, could they have been expressed in language different from this, or from that employed in the Epistle to the Romans and Ephesians? Had we been left to choose out words for setting forth our views, we could not have desired any other than these. Can our opponents say the same? Are these words the most natural and appropriate for expressing their views?

3. This determinate counsel is said positively to have fixed certain events in Christ's history. Now, if some were fixed, we have reason to conclude that all others also were. Yet in the life and death of Christ we see nothing, but what seemed outwardly to occur in the natural order of events. It will certainly be conceded that the will of the Son of God was free from first to last. Yet we learn that what he voluntarily did and suffered was also pre-determined by God. In his case there was entire free-will, yet entire pre-ordination.

What then becomes of the objection to predestination, arising from its supposed interference with the free-will of moral agents? In Christ's life and death we have a series of pre-ordained events, and at the same time a series of free actions. And this is a sufficient answer to the current objection. We may not be able to reconcile these things, yet there they stand palpably before us.

4. This determinate counsel is said to have delivered up Christ into the hands of men. Pilate and Herod, &c., are said to have done what God's hand and counsel had pre-determined. Here is something still more striking. The deeds of these wicked men are said to have come to pass according to this counsel, yet these deeds are not the less wicked, and those men are not the less responsible. Here, again, we have another objection answered, or at least silenced. To reconcile these things may be difficult, yet the statement in this passage is plain. What pride and folly then are there in the questions and cavils which we so often hear in connection with this doctrine. "If God has arranged everything, man's will is not free. How can the sinner be responsible? How can he be plied with motives and arguments? Of what use is it to do anything towards an end, if all be arranged beforehand by another. How unjust is it in God to warn and invite sinners, when he has fixed everything already." All these cavils have their answer in the passages quoted above. It is vain to think of putting questions such as these, till those strong and explicit declarations have been explained away or denied. They teach us plainly that our world's history, in all things great and small, is a history of events pre-ordained by God from eternity, yet at the same time coming to pass by the free agency of man. This preordination is the effect and the expression of God's will, yet it does not in the least interfere with man's responsibility; nor does it suppose any violence done to the will of man.

It was certain that the ten tribes were to revolt, for it was predicted long before; but did that make their revolt less voluntary? It was certain that Israel was to apostatize, and to be carried captive to Babylon, but did that make their apostasy less voluntary or less sinful, or Nebuchadnezzar's act of carrying them captive less free? It was certain that Christ was to be born at Bethlehem, but did that make the coming of his parents to that town less voluntary? It was certain that Judas was to betray Christ, for it had been predicted by David in the Psalms long before, but did that lessen the sin of Judas, or make his act less free? In the same way I might go over every prophecy in Scripture, and ask the same question. And I wonder greatly what the answer of our opponents would be. How can they reconcile with their ideas of free agency the fact that the sin of Judas was predicted by the Holy Spirit, as certain, one thousand years before it came to pass? Was Judas a mere machine, or was God the author of his sin?

But it will be said, Are we not told that this election or predestination is according to foreknowledge? (1 Peter 1:2; Romans 8:29). In reference to the first two of these passages, I would remark that the word "foreknowledge," in the second verse, in the original is the same as that rendered "foreordained" in the twentieth. Now, in the latter of these (20th,) there can be no doubt that it means pre-ordination, for it refers to Christ as the appointed Lamb; and if so, then it is impossible to suppose that the word foreknowledge, in the 2d, refers simply to foreseeing, and nothing more. Or there is another view that may be taken of it. I quote from a tract which I wrote some time ago. "There are some who deny this choosing. They are so zealous for man's free-will, that they will not admit of free-will in God. All the choosing they will allow God to exercise is the choosing of those who be foreknows will turn to him—i.e., choosing those who first choose him. They quote in defence, 1 Peter 1:2, 'elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father;' and they ask, Is not this choosing according to foreknowledge? Yes, beyond all doubt it is. But of what is the foreknowledge? Is it of the evil or the good? Certainly of the evil; for what else was there to foreknow? God, foreknowing all the circumstances of the case—the evil of the whole race of Adam—that there was nothing but evil about any, no desire even to turn or believe, nothing but absolute corruption, enmity, helplessness, and death,—God foreseeing all this, chose some out of this mass of wickedness. And thus they are 'elect according to the foreknowledge of God.'"

But then we are asked to look at Romans 8:29, "Whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." Now, to this the very same answers might be made as in reference to the preceding. But in addition to these let me remark, that the word "foreknow," means not simply to know beforehand, but to "fix the choice upon." The meaning of the passage is then evidently,—whom God set his choice upon, them he predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son. These saints were the objects of his eternal choice, and being so, they were appointed by him to the honor of being made in the image of his own Son.

But on this I shall not dwell farther. I wish to notice some concessions of our adversaries which appear to me to overthrow their whole system. They admit that in certain things there is a real election. They admit, for instance, that there was a real election of the tribe of Levi to the priesthood, and a real election of David to the throne. They admit also, that there is a real election of particular nations to particular privileges and favors.

This admission is fatal to their theory. Their main prop was, that the election of individuals was just another word for favoritism and injustice. Now, if the election of persons be unjust, that of nations must be more unjust. If the one be inconsistent with man's responsibility, so must be the other. If the election of persons show an undue partiality, much more must the election of nations. For God to reveal himself to the Jews, and not to the Egyptians, is as much favoritism as for him to convert one soul, and not to convert another. He did far more for Israel than he did for other nations. He brought them near him. He gave them his word. He taught them the way of forgiveness through the blood of the sacrifice. He placed them in circumstances of peculiar advantage. He did not do this to Babylon or Nineveh, to Assyria or Egypt. Can it be wrong then to choose individuals, and right to choose nations? Can it be wrong not to choose an individual to salvation, and yet right not to choose a nation to those privileges through which alone salvation comes? Can it be right to pass by some nations, and yet wrong to pass by individuals? Nations are composed of individuals, and to choose a nation, is to give the individuals in that nation a peculiar advantage which is denied to others, an advantage which issues in the eternal life of thousands. And hence, if there be any injustice in the matter, there is more injustice in a national election than in a personal one. It will be said, God knew what nations would reject his message, and therefore he did not send it to them. On this I offer the following remarks.

1. A nation being composed of individuals, our opponents must maintain that God foresaw that every soul in these would reject the truth. If not, would it not be hard, upon their theory, for God to withhold the gospel from the whole nations, if he knew that some in these nations would have believed and been saved?

2. If these nations are denied the gospel, because God foreknew they would reject it, then they are condemned for a thing which they never did, but which God merely foresaw they would do. Whole nations are treated as criminals, rejecters of the gospel, when the opportunity was never given them either to receive or reject it. I am not aware of anything in Calvinism so hard or unjust as this. We teach that God punishes men and nations on account of what they actually do, not on account of what he foresees they would do if he allowed them the means. This theory, on the other hand, teaches that whole nations are condemned to that most fearful of all curses, a deprivation of the gospel, not on account of their actual sins, but because certain things were foreseen which they would have done! Now, if God can justly condemn nations on account of sin not committed, but merely foreseen as likely to be committed, why may he not condemn sinners to eternal death for sins never committed, but only foreseen? Would this be just? Strange that men should maintain the justice of depriving nations of the gospel for sins which they never committed, yet affirm the injustice of God choosing a soul to everlasting life according to his sovereign will. But this is just one of the paradoxes of Arininianism. God chooses some to life, it is said, because he foresees they will believe, and he does not choose others to life because he foresees they will not believe. So that it is not faith that saves us, but God's foresight of our faith; nor is it actually unbelief that ruins us, but God's foresight of our unbelief.

3. God speaks of sending his messages to some who would reject, and of not sending it to others who were more likely to have received it. Ezekiel 3:5, 6 "Son of man, go get thee unto the house of Israel, and speak with my words unto them. For thou art not sent to a people of a strange speech, and of an hard language, but to the house of Israel: not to many people of a strange speech, and of an hard language, whose words thou canst not understand. Surely had I sent thee to them they would have hearkened unto thee." This surely settles the matter. It is not a nation's foreseen willingness to hear that leads God to send them his messengers, nor a nation's foreseen unwillingness that prevents him sending these. It is all according to his own sovereign will and purpose.

It is affirmed that there is a work equally in the hearts of all men alike; that God has done, and is doing, the very utmost that can be done for every individual of our race; and that to maintain anything else is to charge God with partiality and injustice, as well as to deny the responsibility of man.

The proof adduced in support of these statements is a passage in the fifth chapter of Isaiah, "What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done to it? But it is remarkable, that this is one of the strongest proofs that God did a great deal more for Israel than he did for any other nation. He allowed the whole world to remain a wilderness, but he made them his vineyard. He fenced this vineyard, he gathered out the stones thereof, and planted it with the choicest vine. "He dealt not so with any other nation." Was this partiality or injustice? Or was this doing the same thing for all?

Besides, it is evident that this passage is perverted. It does not mean that God at that time had done all he could do for Israel. For he went on to do much more for them. Not only did he not cease to bless them, and to strive with them, but he multiplied his blessings, and increased his strivings with them, long after he had uttered the words referred to. So that the passage cannot mean that he had done all he could; for he proceeded to do a great deal more, raising up prophet after prophet, giving them line upon line. Nay, many of the most gracious words that Israel ever heard were spoken after this time. If, then, the verse does not really mean that God had actually done his utmost, the inference which is founded upon it falls to pieces.

It is plain, then, that God does more for some nations than for others. He did more for Israel than he did for Egypt or Babylon. He did more for Israel at one time than at another, for one generation than for another,—nay, for one district of Judea than for another,—nay, for one individual than for another. What else is the meaning of the words of Jesus? "I tell you of a truth, many widows were in Israel in the death of Elias; but unto none of them was Elias sent, save unto Sarepta, a city of Sidon, unto a woman that was a widow. And many lepers were in Israel in the time of Eliseus the prophet, and none of them was cleansed saving Naaman the Syrian."

It is not true, then, that God does no more for one nation than another, or for one individual than another. The opposite of this is, and has always been, the fact—a fact frequently referred to in Scripture, as a proof of God's right to do according to his will in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth. No reasonings of men can alter the fact; nor can any ingenuity deprive that fact of its deep and solemn meaning.

I may perhaps be told that the cause of this inequality is in the church of Christ, which has not done its duty. Had Christians, it is said, acted aright, the world would have been converted long ere now. As this is a common way of attempting to solve the difficulty, it may be well to answer it fully.

1. Who told them that the cause is wholly in the church? Who told them that the world would have been converted before this, had Christians been what they professed? Give me one single passage of Scripture that states this. Surely it is a bold and hazardous assertion to make, without one verse of Scripture to support it.

2. It is not true. What! Is such a mighty and majestic event as the salvation of the world to be dependent upon a creature's will? Is it to depend upon man whether the world is to be converted or not? Has God no purpose to be carried out? Has he nothing at all to say in the matter? Is he to stand by looking on, wondering whether it may please his people to put forth their energies and convert the world?

3. It is unscriptural. There are passages of Scripture which explicitly contradict it. What, for instance, does God mean, when, speaking of Corinth, and giving a reason why he enjoined Paul to remain and labor there, he said, "I have much people in this city?" Again, what is meant by that similar passage, "As many as were ordained to eternal life believed?" Again, what did our Lord mean, when, as if explaining the reason why so many rejected him, he said, "Many are called, but; few are chosen?" Or what did he mean when he said, "This gospel of the kingdom must be preached among all nations FOR A WITNESS, and then shall the end come?" And, lastly, what did the Holy Spirit mean, first, by forbidding the apostles to preach the word in Asia, and then, by prohibiting Paul from passing over and preaching the Gospel in Bithynia? (Acts 16:6, 7).

4. It is profane. It is saying that the wickedness of the world cannot be remedied by God, but only by the church; that God has no power to convert the world; that it is the church which has all the power; and that unless she pleases to put forth her might and zeal, God can do nothing for the world. Poor world! This is sad news indeed! Thy destiny hangs upon the power and love of thy fellow-sinners! The strength and love of thy God are nothing, and can do nothing for thee! Miserable comfort, and miserable comforters, indeed! Yet these are the men who speak so much of the love of God, and accuse others of hiding or denying it!

Yet I am far from saying that Christians are not much to blame. How little do the most zealous amongst us do for souls! How much more might we do by prayer, by labor, and by holy living! Still I deny that the inactivity or unbelief of saints will account for the darkness that overspreads the nations. Failure in duty on the part of the people of God may account for many things, but not for all.

Did the prophets of old fail in their duty, and was their failure the reason why so few in Israel believed the report, or the reason why Nineveh, or Tyre, or Sidon, were not converted? Was it their fault that they were not sent to these cities, and received no message to them? Why were there so many prophets raised up within that small territory, and not one commissioned to bear tidings to a dark and dying world? Could none be spared? Could no more be raised up? Did they refuse to go? Had God no message of grace to give them for the dark millions of Europe in the west, or Asia in the east, or Ethiopia in the south?

Did the Son of God fail in his duty, in that he did not preach the Gospel save to the lost sheep of the house of Israel? Why did he make this distinction? Why did he never travel beyond the narrow Judean circle? Why did he command his disciples at first to make the same difference, prohibiting them from preaching the gospel in any city, either of Gentiles or Samaritans? Might not the Samaritans have said, you tell us that the utmost has been done for us that can be done, and that all are equally dealt with? Why then are we passed by? and why are the messengers of peace prohibited from entering our territory? What answer could be given, save that such was the will and purpose of the God only wise?

Did the apostles afterwards fail in their duty, when, after Pentecost, they went abroad to proclaim the everlasting gospel? Was their failure the reason why the world was not then converted? Are we not plainly taught that such was not the case? Why was it, for instance, that when Paul wished to go to Bithynia to preach the gospel there, the Spirit suffered him not? Was this doing the utmost for Bithynia that God could do? Nay, it was not even doing the utmost that Paul could have done, and wanted to do.

If the Spirit work equally in all, then it is plain that the reason why he succeeds in some and fails in others, must be either the one or the other of the following:—

1. It might be because some have naturally better hearts than others, more inclined towards what is good, made of less rebellious, and more believing materials. This better class of sinners, less stout-hearted than others, yield and obey, and so are saved! The rest, being more stubborn and ungodly, hold out and are lost! What hope does this give to the chief of sinners? Where in all this is there the plucking of brands from the burning?

2. Because the Spirit has attempted a work beyond his power. He fails in his efforts. The sinner has overpowered him, and proved stronger than he. The sinner is able to overcome the Spirit; but the Spirit is not able to overcome the sinner. The Spirit has done his utmost, and failed!

But, finally, to say that the Spirit is doing all he can possibly do for the sinner, is either a mere quibble, a play upon words, or else it is most melancholy profanity. If it mean that literally and truly OMNIPOTENCE has been tasked to its utmost, and failed in the attempt to convert a sinner, it is profanity; for it is saying that the creature is mightier than the Creator, and able to withstand, nay, to overcome, Omnipotence. If, however, this is not what is meant, then what else can be the meaning, but that God is doing all that he sees fit to do for each individual? He is putting forth in each the utmost degree of power that his infinite wisdom sees fit. And if this be all that is intended, then there is no dispute between us. We are at one. For what is this but merely another way of stating Jehovah's absolute and all-wise sovereignty in giving or withholding his blessings?

"What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So that it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, even for the same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endure with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles?"—Romans 9:16-24.

Let me conclude this letter, by calling your attention to the following narrative. If I am not mistaken, the conversation related took place more than half a century ago. It is, however, very suitable as an illustration of some of the points discussed in the preceding pages. The chief speaker was a minister of an Independent congregation. Being once on a journey, he was overtaken by a stranger who urged some objections to predestination, and among others, that it made God unjust. "Before that can be admitted," said the minister, "you must prove that God owes eternal life to any of his fallen creatures; and further, that the vindication of a mortal is essential to the equity of a God. Besides, the question is not, What are the difficulties connected with the doctrine, or can a worm solve them all? but, Is this doctrine of predestination scripturally and philosophically true, or is it not? The difficulties of the subject will prove nothing against the fact; and he that brings the legislation of his Creator before the tribunal of his own understanding, should first be able to measure the length of his eternity, the breadth of his immensity, the height of his wisdom, and the depth of his decrees. Is it not a sad evidence of human depravity, that creatures of a day will sit in judgment on spiritual and eternal things, as if the Author of the great mystery of godliness were altogether such an one as themselves!"

"I hope you will not be offended," replied the gentleman, "if I declare, notwithstanding all you advance, I do not, I cannot believe in this doctrine of predestination."

"And I hope," rejoined Mr. C., "that you will not be offended if I declare, I am quite of opinion you do believe in it."

"I beg, Sir," said the other, "you will explain yourself."

"If you will favor me with the short answer of Yes or No, to a few explicit questions I shall take the liberty to propose," replied Mr. C., "I have little doubt but I can prove what I have affirmed."

"It will afford me great satisfaction," said the other, "to comply with your proposal."

Mr. C. then began, "Are you of opinion that all sinners will be saved?"

"By no means," said the gentleman. "But you have no doubt," added Mr. C., "it will be formally and finally determined, at the day of judgment, who are to be saved, and who are to perish?"

"I am certainly of that opinion," replied the stranger.

"I would ask, then," continued Mr. C., "is the great God under any necessity of waiting till these last awful assizes, in order to determine who are the righteous that are to be saved, and the wicked who are to perish?"

"By no means," said the other; "for he certainly knows already."

"When do you imagine," asked Mr. C., "that he first attained this knowledge?"

Here the gentleman paused, and hesitated a little; but soon answered.

"He must have known from all eternity."

"Then," said Mr. C., "it must have been fixed from all eternity."

"That by no means follows," replied the other.

"Then it follows," added Mr. C., "that he did not know from all eternity, but only guessed, and happened to guess right: for how can Omniscience know what is yet uncertain?"

Here the stranger began to perceive his difficulty, and after a short debate, confessed, it should seem, it must have been fixed from eternity.

"Now," said Mr. C., "one question more will prove that you believe in predestination as well as I. You have acknowledged, what can never be disproved, that God could not know from eternity who shall be saved, unless it had been fixed from eternity. If then it was fixed, be pleased, Sir, to inform me who fixed it?"

The gentleman candidly acknowledged he had never taken this view of the subject before, and said he believed it would be the last time he should attempt to oppose predestination to eternal life.

With this illustration I leave this subject, which I have handled at some length, both because I believe it to be important in itself, and because right views of it lie at the foundation of the Gospel, and of salvation by free grace. If there be no predestination, there can be no "names written in the book of life from the foundation of the world;" and if so, then who can be saved?

I am yours, &c.

THUS SAITH THE LORD:

"In very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power, that my name may be declared throughout all the earth."—Exodus 9:16.

"Seeing his days are determined, the number of his months are with thee; thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot pass."—Job 14:6.

"Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee; and before thou earnest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations"—Jeremiah 1:6.

"And hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation."—Acts 17:26.

"Of him, and through him, and to him are all things."—Romans 11:36.

"The called according to his purpose."—Romans 8:28.

"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will."—Ephesians 1:6.

"Being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will."—Ephesians 1:11.

"According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord."—Ephesians 3:1.

"God hath not appointed us to wrath, but to obtain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ."—1 Thessalonians 5:9.

"God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation."—2 Thessalonians 2:13.

NOTE.

No expression can be stronger than that of Acts 13:48: "As many as were ordained to eternal life, believed." How then do our opponents get rid of it? By saying that it means, "as many as were disposed for eternal life, believed!" Any one who knows the Greek language, or can consult a lexicon, will have no difficulty in seeing that such cannot be the meaning of the passage. I know of no commentator who gives any sanction to such an utter perversion of words. If it does not mean "ordained or appointed," it can only mean "commanded," for these are its two meanings in the New Testament, as any reader may see, by consulting the following passages:—Matthew 28:16; Luke 7:8; Acts 15:2, 22:10, 28:33. In these passages it is the simple verb τασσω that occurs. Its compound διατασσω has just the same meaning. See Matthew 11:1; Luke 3:81, 8:65, 17:9, 10; Acts 7:44. The only passages which can have the slightest bearing upon the proposed perversion of the passage is 1 Corinthians 1615: "They have addicted themselves,"&c. But this is the active voice of the verb, and its meaning is determined by the pronoun themselves, which it governs. Whereas in Acts 13:48 the verb is in the passive voice, and must refer not to their doing something for themselves, but to something done for them by another. To fix myself, and to be fixed by another, are very different things.